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ABSTRACT
We propose modal Markov logic as an extension of propo-
sitional Markov logic to reason under the principle of max-
imum entropy for modal logics K45, KD45, and S5. Anal-
ogous to propositional Markov logic, the knowledge base
consists of weighted formulas, whose weights are learned
from data. However, in contrast to Markov logic, in our
framework we use the knowledge base to define a proba-
bility distribution over non-equivalent epistemic situations
(pointed Kripke structures) rather than over atoms, and use
this distribution to assign probabilities to modal formulas.
As in all probabilistic representations, the central task in our
framework is inference. Although the size of the state space
grows doubly exponentially in the number of propositions
in the domain, we provide an algorithm that scales only ex-
ponentially in the size of the knowledge base. Finally, we
briefly discuss the case of languages with an infinite number
of propositions.
1. INTRODUCTION
The central reasoning task for probabilistic logics is to
infer the probability of a query formula given a knowledge
base. One such logic is propositional Markov logic [4], where
the knowledge base consists of weighted propositional formu-
las. While the weighted formulas define a probability dis-
tribution over possible worlds, and increasing the weight of
a formula increases the probability mass assigned to worlds
where the formula is true, the weights are not true proba-
bilities. Weights can be learned from data or from asser-
tions about the subjective probabilities of statements, or
from both using data and explicit assertions of subjective
probabilities [20]. In any case, the information obtained
from the training data or from an expert can be interpreted
as probabilities of the propositional formulas in the KB.
Hence, propositional Markov logic defines the probability
of formulas in two steps: first learn the weights of formu-
las in the KB given data and/or subjective probabilities of
these propositional formulas, and second, use the learned pa-
rameters to infer the probability of query formulas. Out of
all the possible distributions which satisfy the probabilistic
constraints imposed by the training data or domain expert,
the one defined by Markov logic networks is the maximum
entropy distribution [17], which makes Markov logic an ap-
pealing choice. Markov logic is not the first framework that
has been proposed for doing inference under the principle of
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maximum entropy. For example, a first-order logic language
is used in [12, 2] to reason under maximum entropy and the
maximum entropy distribution is found using conditional
probability constraints in [7, 25].
One of the common approaches for combining probabil-
ities and modal logic builds on a probability distribution
defined over possible worlds [15, 22]. Although efficient
inference algorithms for probabilistic modal logic have ap-
peared in the past [23], they have been based on using a
probabilistic Kripke structure that is explicitly given, not
learned from data or assertions about the probabilities of
formulas. In contrast, our approach generalizes maximum
entropy reasoning for propositional logics to allow both the
formulas in the knowledge base and the queries to be propo-
sitional modal logic formulas. K45, KD45 and S5 are the
modal logics typically referred to as the logics of beliefs and
knowledge. Zero-one laws have been established for such
logics [14, 21], which can make probabilistic reasoning chal-
lenging if the state space is not chosen carefully; hence, we
restrict our domain to be a finite set of epistemic situations
(pointed Kripke structures, i.e., Kripke structures with a
distinguished real world state). The advantage of these
modal logics is that to enumerate all the non-equivalent epis-
temic situations, it suffices to iterate over a finite set as long
as our set of propositional formulas Ω is finite. Although
the number of non-equivalent epistemic situations is finite
in our problem formulation, their number grows 2O(2
|Ω|).
The main contributions of the paper are to show how one
can reason under the principle of maximum entropy when
simple propositional logic is replaced by either single agent
modal logic K45, KD45 or S5, and to provide an exact in-
ference algorithm based on counting, which can drastically
reduce the doubly exponential cost of a naively implemented
inference algorithm to one singly exponential in the size of
the knowledge base. We briefly discuss the case of languages
with an infinite number of propositions.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Markov Logic
Propositional Markov logic [4] is a knowledge represen-
tation language that uses weighted propositional formulas
to define probability distributions over truth assignments to
propositions. A propositional Markov logic network consists
of a knowledge base KB = {(wi, Fi)|i = 1, . . . ,m}, where
wi ∈ R and Fi is a propositional formula over a fixed set
of propositions Ω = {p1, . . . , p|Ω|}, and defines a probability
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distribution over truth assignments X to Ω as follows:
Pr(X = x) =
1
Z
exp(
X
i
wifi(x)) , (1)
where fi(x) = 1 if Fi is true under x, otherwise fi(x) = 0,
and where Z =
P
x∈X exp(
P
i wifi(x)) is the partition func-
tion, and X denotes the set of all possible truth assignments
to Ω, (i.e, |X | = 2|Ω|). Note that, (1) defines an exponential
family of distributions (see e.g. [26]). Exponential families
have the property that for a given set of fi they describe
the maximum entropy distribution that satisfies the set of
consistent constraints E[fi] = ci. Consistent here means
that there exists a probability distribution that satisfies all
the constraints simultaneously. We can interpret ci as the
probability of the propositional formula being satisfied un-
der a randomly chosen truth assignment x, hence (1) defines
the maximum entropy distribution over the state space of
truth assignments to the propositions with the constraints
E[fi] = ci. The probability of an arbitrary propositional
formula F over Ω is defined to be the probability of F being
true under a randomly chosen truth assignment X, i.e.:
Pr(F ) =
X
x∈X :F is satisfied under x
Pr(X = x) = E[fi] . (2)
2.2 Modal Logics K45, KD45 and S5
Modal logics K45, KD45 and S5 [3] extend propositional
or first-order logic by adding a non-truth-functional senten-
tial operators; we will again only discuss the propositional
case here. We use the symbol B to represent the modal op-
erator in the language. Where α is a well formed sentence,
then Bα is a well formed sentence. For example, if we take B
to mean “the agent knows that”, then the formula Bp∨B¬p
means that agent i knows whether or not p holds. Note that
this is quite different from the tautology Bp ∨ ¬Bp.
Different modal operators for concepts such as belief, knowl-
edge, desire, obligation, etc., can be specified by the axiom
schemas that they satisfy. In this paper, we will consider
only modal logics K45, KD45, and S5. The properties of
each of these logics is the subset of the following axioms and
rules [6]:
R1. From φ and φ ⊃ ψ infer ψ (Modus ponens)
R2. From ψ infer Bψ (Knowledge Generalization)
A1. All tautologies of propositional calculus
A2. (Bφ ∧B(φ ⊃ ψ)) ⊃ Bψ (Distribution Axiom)
A3. Bφ ⊃ φ (Knowledge Axiom)
A4. Bφ ⊃ BBφ (Positive Introspection Axiom)
A5. ¬Bφ ⊃ B¬Bφ (Negative Introspection Axiom)
A6. ¬Bfalse (Consistency Axiom)
We get K45 if we take R1, R2, A1, A2, A4, and A5. Besides
the axioms of K45, KD45 contains A6 and S5 contains A3.
S5 is generally used to represent knowledge, and KD45 be-
liefs. K45 is similar to KD45 ; however, it allows believing
in contradicting statements.
The common property of these logics is that every formula
has an equivalent representation that has depth one, i.e., if
Bφ is a subformula then φ does not contain any other modal
operators. In the rest of the paper we will always assume
that we are only dealing with depth one modal formulas.
A Kripke structure over a set of propositions Ω is a tuple
M = (S, π,K) where S = ∅ is the set of states, π : S → X ,
where X is the set of truth assignments over Ω and K ⊆
S × S. If s ∈ S then for a propositional formula F , we have
M, s |= F if F is satisfied under π(s). For a formula BF ,
we have M, s |= BF iff ∀(s, r) ∈ K : M, r |= F . Moreover,
M, s |= F1 ∧ F2 iff M, s |= F1 and M, s |= F2, and M, s |=
¬F iff M, s |= F .
For each different modal logic, Kripke structures with
different properties are associated. Reflexive, symmetric,
and transitive relations (equivalence relations) are associ-
ated with modal operators that satisfy S5. Euclidean, serial,
and transitive relations are associated with KD45. While
Euclidean, and transitive relations are associated with K45.
For a more detailed description of Kripke structures see, e.g.,
[3, 6].
A Kripke structure with a distinguished state (generally
denoting the real world) is called a pointed Kripke structure
or (epistemic) situation, hence an epistemic situation σ =
(s, S, π,K) where s ∈ S. We call two epistemic situations σ1
and σ2 equivalent if for every formula F we have σ1 |= F if
and only if σ2 |= F . Using this definition of equivalence, we
can partition situations into equivalence classes.
We can enumerate all the non-equivalent epistemic situa-
tions for K45, KD45 and S5, i.e., we can select a member
from each equivalence class by storing the worlds the agent
considers possible and a distinguished real world state [6].
The Kripke structures have a fully connected sub-graph be-
longing to the possible worlds, and there is a special state
s; in the case of S5, s is included in the fully connected
states, and in KD45, there is an outgoing arc from s to
every node representing a possible world. In both cases,
the set of possible worlds is never empty. The difference
between KD45 and K45 is that the set of possible worlds
in K45 can be empty. Let ΣK45, ΣKD45 and ΣS5 denote
the set of all possible situations we can construct using the
previous descriptions for modal logics K45, KD45 and S5,
respectively. According to [6], if a formula is satisfiable it
must be satisfiable in one of the situations in our Σ, and
since not any two members of Σ are equivalent it is enough
to consider the members of Σ to count every non-equivalent
epistemic situations exactly once. For K45, KD45, and S5, if
the set of propositions (Ω) is fixed, then |ΣK45| = 22|Ω|2|Ω|,
|ΣKD45| = (22|Ω| − 1)2|Ω|, |ΣS5| = 22|Ω|−12|Ω|, respectively.
In each case, the real world can be chosen from the possible
2|Ω| truth assignments. In K45 the worlds the agent can
consider to be possible can be any subset of all the possi-
ble worlds, i.e., can have 22
|Ω|
values; in KD45, the subset
cannot be empty; and in S5, since the real world must be
considered possible, we can only pick a subset of the re-
maining truth assignments. We see that |Σ| ≤ 2|Ω|22|Ω| in
all the three cases. We will denote the above mentioned sets
by ΣL(Ω), where L ∈ {K45 ,KD45 ,S5}, when we want to
emphasize their dependence on Ω.
3. DEFINING THE MAXIMUM ENTROPY
DISTRIBUTION
Since the maximum entropy distribution can be sensitive
to the choice of the state space (see, e.g., [13, 16]), we have
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to be careful when we choose our state space in order to
avoid non-intuitive results. E.g., if Ω = {p}, and we want to
reason about the knowledge of someone using modal logic
S5, a straightforward extension might seem to be to add a
“modal atom”Bp to Ω and define a probability distribution
over the modally consistent truth assignments to this set
{p,Bp}, ruling out e.g., the case when p is assigned false and
Bp is assigned true. However, it is easy to see that with an
empty KB, Pr(p) = 1
3
, which seems counter-intuitive, since
we have no reason to believe that p is more likely to be true
than to be false (analogous examples in a different domain
are given in [13]). Moreover, if Ω contains more propositions,
selection of modal atoms becomes more complicated, e.g., if
Ω = {p, q} should we choose only Bp, Bq, B¬p and B¬q as
modal atoms, or should we also include B(p ∨ q)? Without
including the latter, its probability can only be bounded but
not determined, because a truth assignment to the rest of
the modal atoms would not be sufficient to decide its truth
value.
Based on the above mentioned problems our goals should
be as follows:
(i) Assign probabilities to arbitrary modal or non-modal
formulas over a fixed set of propositions Ω based on a
set of weighted formulas KB = {(wi, Fi)} in a well-
defined way.
(ii) If KB contains only weighted non-modal formulas,
we should obtain the distribution that propositional
Markov logic would define.
(iii) If KB does not contain infinite weights and ψ sub-
sumes φ, and φ and ψ are non-equivalent, then Pr(ψ) <
Pr(φ).
These criteria can be achieved by assigning probabilities
to epistemic situations rather than to modal atoms. Given
a non-empty set of epistemic situations Σ over a fixed Ω
propositions, we define the probability of σ ∈ Σ as:
Pr(σ) =
1
Z
exp(
X
i:σ|=fi
wi) , (3)
where the partition function is defined as:
Z =
X
σ∈Σ
exp(
X
i:σ|=fi
wi) . (4)
The probability of a formula φ (modal or non-modal) is
defined as:
Pr(φ) =
X
σ∈Σ:σ|=φ
Pr(σ) . (5)
Property (i) clearly holds, no matter how we choose Σ. To
satisfy Property (ii) it must be true that c(x) = |{(M, s) ∈
Σ|π(s) = x}| has the same value for every truth assignment
x over Ω. If Σ contains every non-equivalent situations then
Property (iii) is clearly satisfied as well. Hence, if we choose
the state space to be ΣK45, ΣKD45 or ΣS5, all the desired
three conditions are satisfied.
Note that we could define the same distribution using
modal atoms as we do by defining distribution over ΣK45,
ΣKD45 or ΣS5. E.g., we define the same distribution if we
choose the modal atoms to be all the propositional atoms,
and all the depth one formulas in the form Bc, where c is a
conjunction which contains every proposition either as pos-
itive or a negative literal. However, for our goals we found
the approach to define the distribution over epistemic situa-
tions more general, because in this way Property (i) always
holds, we do not have to account for modally inconsistent
states, moreover, it is easier to decide whether Properties
(ii) and (iii) hold.
4. INFERENCE
The computationally expensive part of determining (3)
and (5) can both be reduced to the computation of a parti-
tion function (4). E.g., to infer the probability of a formula
F not present in the knowledge base KB, we first have to
create a new knowledge base KB′ = KB ∪ {(∞, F )}. If Z
and Z′ denote the partition functions corresponding to the
knowledge bases KB and KB′, respectively, then it follows
from (3), (4) and (5) that Pr(F ) = Z
′
Z
.
Computing the partition function is challenging because
the size of the state space for K45, KD45 and S5 are all
doubly exponential in |Ω| as mentioned in Sec. 2.2. On the
other hand, there is much symmetry in the domain, i.e.,
many situations have the same probability; hence Σ can be
divided into equivalence classes. Similar to lifted inference
techniques for quantified probabilistic logics (a highly active
research area today, e.g. [24, 18, 11]), we show how one can
compute the partition function without explicitly iterating
through every state in the domain. Although our exact in-
ference algorithm is exponential in a quantity describing the
complexity of the knowledge base, it is vastly faster than
iterating through the 2O(2
|Ω|) epistemic situations in ΣK45,
ΣKD45, or ΣS5. We are going to assume that we have access
to a propositional model counter, i.e., for any propositional
formula we can tell the number of its satisfying truth assign-
ments. (Exhaustive solvers run in exponential time, which is
sufficient for our claimed bounds, but heuristic/approximate
solvers such as, e.g., SampleSearch [10], may be more useful
in practice.) We now show how to reduce the computation
of a partition function to counting epistemic situations that
satisfy a given set of modal logic formulas. We first intro-
duce truth assignments to formulas in the knowledge base. If
KB = {(w1, F1), . . . , (wn, Fn)}, let T be the set of length n
Boolean vectors. For t ∈ T let Φ(t) be a conjunction where
the i-th term is Fi if ti = true, and it is ¬Fi if ti = false.
Members of T will partition the space of epistemic situations
Σ into disjoint sets. σ1, σ2 ∈ Σ will be in the same partition
if for every t ∈ T we have σ1 |= Φ(t) iff σ2 |= Φ(t). If σ1
and σ2 are in the same partition then Pr(σ1) = Pr(σ2). To
simplify notation, let w(t) =
P
i:ti=true wi, i.e., w(t) is the
sum of the weights of the formulas to which t assigns true.
Hence, we can rewrite (4) as:
Z =
X
t∈T
N(Φ(t)) exp(w(t)) , (6)
where N(φ) denotes the number of epistemic situations where
φ holds, i.e., N(φ) = |{σ ∈ Σ|σ |= φ}|.
The probability of any query formula F can be written as:
Pr(F ) =
1
Z
X
t∈T
N(Φ(t) ∧ F ) exp(w(t)) . (7)
Next, we show how to compute N(F ) for different formu-
las. Table 1 contains the simple counts for different basic
formulas in K45, KD45, or S5. We use the notation c(φ) for
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the number of satisfying truth assignments of propositional
formula φ. Using the rules in (8) we can compute N(F ) for
any formula which is in CNF normal form, where each term
is either a propositional formula, or in the form Bφ or ¬Bφ,
where φ is a propositional formula. The most general form
of a conjunction is C = φ0 ∧Bψ∧ (∧ki=1¬Bφi) (we call such
conjunctions simple), since Bφ1 ∧ Bφ2 = B(φ1 ∧ φ2). The
counting of the satisfying assignments of C is done by the
inclusion-exclusion principle and by counting the members
of the complement of sets.
Example 1. If p and q are propositions and F = (p ⊃
q) ∧B(p ∨ q) ∧ ¬Bp ∧ ¬Bq:
N(F ) = N((p ⊃ q) ∧B(p ∨ q) ∧ ¬Bp ∧ ¬Bq)
= N((p ⊃ q) ∧B(p ∨ q))−
ˆ
N((p ⊃ q) ∧B(p ∨ q) ∧Bp)+
N((p ⊃ q) ∧B(p ∨ q) ∧Bq)−
N((p ⊃ q) ∧B(p ∨ q) ∧Bp ∧Bq)˜
= N((p ⊃ q) ∧B(p ∨ q))−N((p ⊃ q) ∧Bp)−
N((p ⊃ q) ∧Bq) + N((p ⊃ q) ∧B(p ∧ q))
Hence, a CNF formula with this general type of conjunc-
tions can represent any modal formula in K45, KD45, and
S5 since every formula in K45, KD45, and S5 have an equiv-
alent depth one representation (which can possibly increase
the size of the formula drastically). (To see why a depth
one representation for every formula F exists, consider the
set of modal atoms presented at the end of Sec. 3. Since
every epistemic situation can be characterized by a conjunc-
tion of these modal atoms where each literals is either a
positive or negative modal atom, we can form a depth one
formula by taking the disjunction of the situations where
F holds.) The final piece of computation of N(F ) for a
CNF formula F again uses the inclusion-exclusion principle,
replacing the computation for disjunctions with (exponen-
tially) many conjunctions.
Example 2. In modal logic S5, p and q being proposi-
tions, the use of inclusion-exclusion principle to reduce the
computation of N(F ) for the CNF formula F = (p ⊃ q) ∨
Bp) ∧ (p ∨B(p ∨ q)) proceeds as follows:
N(F ) = N(((p ⊃ q) ∨Bp) ∧ (p ∨B(p ∨ q)))
= N((p ⊃ q) ∧ (p ∨B(p ∨ q)))+
N(Bp ∧ (p ∨B(p ∨ q)))−
N((p ⊃ q) ∧Bp ∧ (p ∨B(p ∨ q)))
= N((p ⊃ q) ∧ p) + N((p ⊃ q) ∧B(p ∨ q))−
N((p ⊃ q) ∧ p ∧B(p ∨ q)) + N((Bp ∧ p)+
N(Bp ∧B(p ∨ q))−N(Bp ∧ p ∧B(p ∨ q))−
(N((p ⊃ q) ∧Bp ∧ p)+
N((p ⊃ q) ∧Bp ∧B(p ∨ q))−
N((p ⊃ q) ∧Bp ∧ p ∧B(p ∨ q)))
We see that each term can be easily computed using the rules
in Table 1 and the expressions in (8).
N(∨ki=1Bφi) =
kX
i=1
(−1)i+1
X
1≤j1<j2<...<ji≤k
N(B(φj1 ∧ . . . ∧ φji))
(8)
N(∧ki=1¬Bφi) = N(true)−
kX
i=1
(−1)i+1
X
1≤j1<j2<...<ji≤k
N(B(φj1 ∧ . . . ∧ φji))
N(φ0 ∧Bψ ∧ (∧ki=1¬Bφi)) = N(φ0 ∧Bψ)−
kX
i=1
(−1)i+1
X
1≤j1<j2<...<ji≤k
N(φ0 ∧Bψ ∧B(φj1 ∧ . . . ∧ φji))
N((∨ki=1Fi) ∧ F ) =
kX
i=1
(−1)i+1
X
1≤j1<j2<...<ji≤k
N(F ∧ Fj1 ∧ . . . ∧ Fji)
Using the established rules of counting we could give a time
complexity result of our inference algorithm for CNF for-
mulas, but instead we give results for formulas in a more
general form. The most general language L(Ω) we use is
defined as follows:
• Every propositional formula is a member of L(Ω),
• If φ is a propositional formula, then Bφ ∈ L(Ω),
• If φ ∈ L(Ω), then ¬φ ∈ L(Ω),
• If φ1, φ2 ∈ L(Ω), then φ1 ∧ φ2 ∈ L(Ω).
Hence, we only allow depth one modal formulas, however,
since in modal logics K45, KD45, and S5, every formula has
an equivalent depth one representation, we can allow this
restriction without the loss of generality.
Theorem 1. Counting the non-equivalent epistemic sit-
uations that satisfy a depth one formula F ∈ L(Ω) in K45,
KD45, or S5 can be accomplished in time 2O(|F |+|Ω|).
We use the following definition and lemma to prove The-
orem 1.
Definition 1. For a formula F let IF : Σ → {0, 1} de-
note the characteristic function of F in the space of all non-
equivalent epistemic situations, i.e., IF (σ) = 1 iff σ |= F .
The next result shows that the characteristic function of
a depth one formula can be expressed as a combination of
characteristic functions of simple conjunctions.
Lemma 1. For a depth one modal logic formula F ∈ L(Ω)
in K45,KD45 or S5, it is always possible to represent IF =PK
i=1 wiICi where every wi ∈ {−1,+1}, |Ci| ≤ |F |, every
Ci is a simple conjunction (i.e., in the form φ
i
0 ∧ Bψi ∧
(∧lik=1¬Bφik)), and K ≤ 2|F |.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on the struc-
ture of F . For the base cases where F is either a proposi-
tional formula, or in the form Bφ where φ is a propositional
formula, the claim clearly holds. Suppose that F = ¬F1.
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F N(F )
K45 KD45 S5
true |ΣK45| = 2|Ω|22|Ω| |ΣKD45| = 2|Ω|(22|Ω| − 1) |ΣS5| = 2|Ω|22|Ω|−1
propositional formula φ c(φ)22
|Ω|
c(φ)(22
|Ω| − 1) c(φ)22|Ω|−1
Bφ 2|Ω|2c(φ) 2|Ω|(2c(φ) − 1) c(φ)2c(φ)−1
φ0 ∧Bφ c(φ0)2c(φ) c(φ0)(2c(φ) − 1) c(φ0 ∧ φ)2c(φ)−1
¬Bφ |ΣK45| −N(Bφ) |ΣKD45| −N(Bφ) |ΣS5| −N(Bφ)
Table 1: Basic counting rules for K45, KD45, and S5
The claim of the lemma holds for F1 (by induction hypoth-
esis), and hence:
IF1 =
KX
i=1
wiICi . (9)
Then we have
IF = Itrue − IF1 = Itrue −
KX
i=1
wiICi . (10)
Now suppose F = F1 ∧ F2. Then:
IF = IF1IF2 =
K1X
i=1
K2X
j=1
w1i w
2
j IC1i
IC2j
=
K1X
i=1
K2X
j=1
w1i w
2
j IC1i ∧C2j .
(11)
Notice that |C1 ∧ C2| ≤ |F1| + |F2| + 1 ≤ |F | and K1K2 ≤
2|F1|+|F2| ≤ 2|F |.
Corollary 1. Since N(F ) =
P
σ∈Σ IF (σ), we have
N(F ) =
KX
i=1
X
σ∈Σ
ICi(σ) =
KX
i=1
wiN(Ci) , (12)
i.e., the problem of counting epistemic situations in which F
is satisfied has been reduced to counting epistemic situations
in which the basic conjunctions Ci are satisfied.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 1
Proof Proof of Theorem 1. According to Corollary 1,
N(F ) =
PK
i=1 wiN(Ci). We first note that using the inclusion-
exclusion principle (see (8)) for every i we can compute
N(Ci) in time 2
O(|Ci|+|Ω|). (Note that the bound on the
running time is large enough to allow counting the satisfying
assignments of the necessary propositional formulas.) Since
K ≤ 2|F | and for every i we have |Ci| ≤ |F |, computing
N(F ) can be accomplished in 2O(|F |+|Ω|).
Corollary 2. Computing the partition function in (6)
for a knowledge base consisting of formulas with depth at
most one can be accomplished in time 2O(|F |+|Ω|).
5. INFINITE DOMAINS
Although the main focus of the paper is finite domains, we
briefly discuss here the case of infinite domains. The source
of finiteness in our formulation is that there are only a finite
set of non-equivalent epistemic situations over a given set of
propositions (Ω). We now consider the questions regarding
the effect of increasing the size of Ω where the state space
is, as before, the set of non-equivalent epistemic situations:
1. Do zero-one laws hold for infinite domains?
2. Given a knowledge base of equality constraints on the
probabilities of formulas, are there formulas the prob-
ability of which have to be either 0 or 1?
The existence of zero-one laws is well-known for first-order
logic [9, 5] and for modal logic [14]. In the modal logic set-
ting, the zero-one law states that given an arbitrary formula,
the probability of it being valid in a randomly chosen Kripke
structure with N number of states converges to 1 or to 0 as
N →∞. In [14], the state space can contain multiple Kripke
structures with N states that are equivalent; hence, the size
of the state space is not bounded, despite Ω being finite.
Moreover, the focus of their paper is on the probability of a
formula being valid in a randomly chosen Kripke structure,
while we are interested in the probability of a formula being
satisfied in a randomly chosen epistemic situation. To show
the contrast, consider the case of an empty knowledge base
which defines a uniform distribution over the situations. The
probability of a proposition p being true will always be 0.5
regardless of |Ω|, hence its probability is not going to con-
verge to 0 or to 1. However, e.g. Pr(Bφ) → 0 if φ is not
a tautology, otherwise Pr(Bφ) → 1 (we can verify this by
taking the limit of N(true)
N(Bφ)
using Table 1 and that adding k
more propositions to Ω changes the value of c(φ) to c(φ)2k).
More generally:
Theorem 2. If C is a consistent simple conjunction, i.e.,
C = φ0∧Bψ∧(∧ki=1¬Bφi) where ψ and every φi is a propo-
sitional formula and β is a propositional formula s.t. C∧Bβ
is consistent as well, then lim|Ω|→∞
N(Bβ∧C)
N(C)
= 0 if ψ |= β,
otherwise lim|Ω|→∞
N(Bβ∧C)
N(C)
= 1.
The proof of Theorem 2 makes use of the following lemmas
(which we prove only for K45 ).
Lemma 2. If φ0, ψ and β are propositional formulas and
φ0 ∧ψ is satisfiable then lim|Ω|→∞ N(φ0∧Bψ∧Bβ)N(φ0∧Bψ) = 0 if ψ |=
β, otherwise lim|Ω|→∞
N(φ0∧Bψ∧Bβ)
N(φ0∧Bψ) = 1.
Proof. We only prove the lemma for K45. Similar proof
works for KD45 and S5. Assume φ0, ψ and β only build
on propositions from a set Ω′ and let k = |Ω| − |Ω′|. For
a propositional formula F that builds only on propositions
from Ω′ let c′(F ) denote the number of its satisfying truth
assignments over Ω′. We have
N(φ0 ∧Bψ ∧Bβ)
N(φ0 ∧Bψ) =
2kc′(φ0 ∧ ψ ∧ β)22kc′(ψ∧β)
2kc′(φ0 ∧ ψ)22kc′(ψ)
(13)
=
c′(φ0 ∧ ψ ∧ β)
c′(φ0 ∧ ψ) 2
2k(c′(ψ∧β)−c′(ψ))
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(note that N counts epistemic situations over Ω whereas c′
counts satisfying assignments over Ω′). Since if ψ |= β then
c′(ψ ∧ β) − c′(φ) < 0, hence the ratio converges to 0 as
k → ∞. It is easy to verify that if ψ |= β this ratio is 1 for
every k.
The next result means that as the number of extra propo-
sitions increases we can remove terms in the form ¬Bφ from
simple conjunctions.
Lemma 3. If C is a consistent simple conjunction, i.e.,
C = φ0∧Bψ∧(∧ki=1¬Bφi) where ψ and every φi is a propo-
sitional formula then lim|Ω|→∞
N(φ0∧Bψ)
N(C)
= 1.
Proof. If we expand C according to the inclusion-exclusion
principle (equation (8)) we can conclude that
lim
|Ω|→∞
N(φ0 ∧Bψ)
N(C)
= 1
since for all the other terms
lim
|Ω|→∞
N (φ0 ∧Bψ ∧B(φj1 ∧ . . . ∧ φji))
N(φ0 ∧Bψ) = 0
according to Lemma 2.
We can prove now Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. Theorem 2 immediately follows
from the following telescopic product
N(Bβ ∧ C)
N(φ0 ∧Bψ ∧Bβ)
N(φ0 ∧Bψ ∧Bβ)
N(φ0 ∧Bψ)
N(φ0 ∧Bψ)
N(C)
(14)
where the first and third terms converge to 1 (using Lemma 3).
The claim now follows from Lemma 2 applied to the second
term.
Using Theorem 2, we can simplify the computation of
N(φ) in the limit |Ω| → ∞ for any formula φ by drop-
ping terms in the form ¬Bφ whenever we encounter a con-
junction in the most general form; in addition, we can ex-
pect to neglect the majority of the terms when using the
inclusion-exclusion rule. Unfortunately, one consequence of
Theorem 2 is that the weight of certain formulas in the
knowledge base will go to infinity as |Ω| → ∞. Consider,
e.g., the simple formula Bp in the knowledge base. If its
weight is w, then Pr(Bp) = N(Bp) exp(w)
N(Bp) exp(w)+N(¬Bp) which con-
verges to 0 for any finite w, hence 0 < Pr(Bp) < 1 cannot
be captured with any finite w as we increase |Ω|.
One way we can avoid this phenomenon is to define w as a
function of |Ω| as [16] suggests for first-order Markov logic.
Another approach would be to choose Σ not to include every
non-equivalent episetemic situations. If this were done, any
learned model would not be able to satisfy Property (iii), but
could achieve non-zero and non-one probabilities for every
modal formula with finite w values.
6. RELATED WORK
Reasoning with a knowledge base of statistical informa-
tion have been approached in many different ways. The
ones making use of the principle of maximum entropy [17]
seem to be more natural, because when multiple distribu-
tions are consistent with our knowledge base, then there is
no reason to prefer one over the other. In [12], first-order
logic is the representational language and a connection be-
tween maximum entropy reasoning is presented when unary
predicates are used. Markov logic [4] is one of the most
popular choices in the statistical relational learning com-
munity for reasoning under the maximum entropy with a
first-order logic knowledge base. Propositional Markov logic
is generalized in [7] by using different features that are ca-
pable of capturing conditional probabilities. Although we
do not mention representation of conditional probabilities,
our framework could be generalized in this direction. Max-
imum entropy models are sensitive to the choice of domain,
but whether this is a property of other kinds of models is
discussed in [13]. [16] proposes to make the weights depen-
dent on the size of the domain to counter act against the
change of marginals when the domain size changes. Hence,
it is not surprising that we eventually encountered the issue
of changing marginals in both of our chosen state spaces.
Zero-one laws for first-order logic are long known [9, 5]; for
modal logics, they were established in [14]; and for condi-
tional probabilities in [21]. In our setting when we have a
finite number of propositions our state space is always finite,
hence we only experience the convergence of the probability
of certain formulas to 0 and to 1 when we started increasing
the number of propositions. Probabilistic modal logic has
been proposed in [22] and an efficient inference algorithm in
[23]. Although their proposed framework is capable of an-
swering queries using given a probabilistic Kripke structure,
but not suitable for learning the probabilistic model given
a probabilistic knowledge base. In contrast, our approach
defines an exponential family or probability distributions,
hence the learning of the parameters of the distribution is a
convex optimization problem (see e.g. [19]).
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we showed a way to extend propositional
Markov logic with modal operators using epistemic situa-
tions (pointed Kripke structures) as basic building blocks
of the domain. The modal logics we focused on were K45,
KD45, and S5 for a single agent. The common theme in
the modal logics we considered is that the number of non-
equivalent epistemic situations is finite, but grows doubly
exponentially with the number of propositions in the do-
main. However, we provided an exact inference algorithm
where complexity is only singly exponential in the size of
the knowledge base.
Although we only provided an exact inference algorithm,
the three main parts of computations we need to perform
for exact inference can all be approximated. Bonferroni in-
equalities can provide an approximation when we use the
inclusion-exclusion principle in our computations; in addi-
tion, our discussion of infinite domains suggest that the
bounds of the approximation will be sharp as we increase
the size of the domain. Heuristics for approximately count-
ing satisfying assignments of propositional formulas exist,
and toolboxes are readily available [10]. Finally, iterating
through all the possible truth assignments to the formulas in
the knowledge base can be avoided by sampling from the as-
signments using importance sampling (the idea is described
in [11]).
We discussed the challenges of extending the framework
to infinite domains, where the number of propositions is un-
bounded. Further examination of infinite domains is one of
our future goals.
We only discussed modal logics with a single agent, since
for multiple agents the number of non-equivalent epistemic
227
situations even over a fixed set of propositions is unbounded.
Another future goal is to explore if we can do inference ef-
ficiently in the multi agent setting despite the infinite state
space.
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